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It is not by speculating on the abstract relations of Ideal nations that men
will bring more order and justice into the relations of State, it is by looking
at the facts in their reality and seeking, without illusion, without passion,
and without surrender the laws that govern them.'
. INTRODUCTION
R ECOGNITION is the act whereby the Executive of a nation for-
mally acknowledges the existence of a new state or government and
determines that all of the legal consequences flowing from this act must
operate. This unilateral action is a fundamental event of international
law for it results in international rights and obligations upon the new
entity. Profound consequences necessarily flow from this determination
affecting development of normal relations, the prestige of the emerging
states, access to potential revenue, and access to foreign legal systems.
Notwithstanding the importance of recognition, the term has been
confused with "normalization of diplomatic relations" and used with
distressing imprecision by both lawyers and political theorists. It is
therefore essential to develop a clear understanding of the nature and
functions of recognition.
The United States was not always plagued with doctrinal incon-
sistencies regarding the nature and function of recognition. As the first
Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson maintained that recognitional
decisions should be based not on the constitutional legitimacy of a
government, but rather on its actual ability to exercise effective control
over its territory and population. 2 These standards remained unchanged
1. C. Vxsscmm, THEORY AND REALrry iN Punrac INTRmNAToINAL LAw 136 (P.
Corbett trans. 1968) [hereinafter cited as VisscHE].
2. Jefferson, the great revolutionary, once said, "I hold that a little revolution now
and then is a good thing and is as necessary in the political world as storms In the
physical.. .. It is a medicine necessary for the sound health of government." J. GomXr,
ThE RE oCOGNION PoLicy o" THE UNITED STATES 100 (1915). Rebellion has been
said to be the only true guarantee possessed by the people against bad government.
[ 173 ]
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until the late nineteenth century. The so-called "Seward Doctrine",
advocated in the post-Civil War reconstruction era, suggested a de-
parture from the Jeffersonian focus upon de facto criteria controlling
recognition. But no concrete action on this theory was taken until the
failure of the United States to recognize the existence of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the 1920's. Since then, there
has been substantial controversy over the proper function of recognition
in international law.
The primary purpose of international law is to regulate the conduct
of political entities in harmonious co-existence within a world com-
munity. Such a purpose cannot be achieved if one of the entities is
free to liberate itself from the restraints of law with respect to the
other entities by simply refusing to recognize them.4 Therefore, bind-
ing legal standards governing recognitional determination must be
developed and applied.
This note will propose that recognition be fundamentally premised
upon international legal standards rather than political considerations.
In addressing this issue, the note will initially analyze the theoretical
and historical foundations of the concept of recognition. The incon-
sistencies of the United States and British positions will be considered
in order to demonstrate the importance of developing a new recogni-
tional policy. In conclusion, the note will discuss whether there is a
duty to recognize and the factors that may trigger or limit such an
obligation.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN RECOGNITIONAL
CONCEPTS
A. Origins
1. Development of the Sovereign System.
International law has evolved from a system of consensual relation-
ships among autonomous sovereigns into a balance between contractual
theories and a superimposed international legal order. The concept of
state sovereignty is the foundation of all traditional notions of inter-
national law. Since the creation of the United Nations, international
organizations and conventions have had more influence on the inter-
national legal order. However, since no multilateral treaty or conven-
3. See infra, note 47 and accompanying text.
4. T. CHF,' , THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 3 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as CHEN].
tion governs recognition of foreign states, the standards controlling
recognition must necessarily be gleaned from traditional concepts of
international law as modified by recent United Nations imposed obli-
gations.5 It is therefore helpful to trace the historical development of
the concept of state sovereignty and its relationship to international
law before analyzing recognitional concepts.
There was no international law until the breakdown of the me-
dieval respublica christiana of the Middle Ages in the early sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. Before the Reformation the will of the state
lacked any sovereign character. The state was regarded as inherently
limited by the laws of God and nature; any enactment of the state
contrary to those laws was inherently void. Western Europe was a
single Christian brotherhood where men, not states, were the essential
units.6
A system of independent sovereign states was initially established
in 1648 by the Treaty of Westphalia. 7 This treaty acknowledged the
independence of Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the German Reich,
and accorded the Protestant states equal standing with the Catholic
states. This multilateral acknowledgment of the independence of in-
dividual state governments heralded the beginning of the sovereign
system and the demise of the Holy Roman Empire. As a system of in-
dependent legal entities replaced the legal order of the Empire, the
foundations of an international legal system developed.
2. Positive International Law.
Positive international law is the law applied in the relations of
states which is made binding solely by reason of the obligatory char-
acter that the parties recognize in it. This concept of law is based in
the system of absolute state sovereignty.
After the demise of the Holy Roman Empire, there was no binding
international legal order to supervise relations among states. In the
absence of this overseeing power, certain rules of conduct were needed
to enable states equally sovereign to deal with one another. The rules
that were developed constituted the "law of nations." Notwithstand-
ing the fact that the "law of nations" was the root of modem inter-
5. See U.N. Doc. A/5763 (1964); U.N. Doc. A/AC 119/SR. 9 (1964); U.N. Doc.
A/AC 119 SR 116 (1964).
6. L. JAFFE, JuDir.AL ASPECTS OF FoaszcN RELAMrxOS 82 (1933) [hereinafter
cited as JA=].
7. Treaty df Westphalia (Oct 24, 1648) I TnE CONSOLDATED TInrATY Smmnus
319-56 (C. Parry comp. 1969).
RECOGNITON OF FOREIGN STATESIssue
HASTINGS INT'L AND COMPARATIVE LAW' REVIEW Inaugural
national law, the law that developed during this period was nothing
more than a formalized code of diplomatic conduct: the self-imposed
morality of nations dealing with one another if, when and in the man-
ner they chose. The primary purpose of the system was protection
against intervention into the internal politics of one sovereign by
another, manifested in the formalities of international relations: the
code of diplomatic conduct and the ceremonial rules and practices of
diplomatic intercourse.8
During the nineteenth century the consensual "law of nations"
evolved into a positivist theory of international law. Under this theory,
a state is bound by international law only to the extent that it has con-
tracted with other states to be so bound.9 Despite the shift from the
purely consensual to the contractual basis of international law, the
foundation of the international legal system remained a body of law
derived from the agreement of sovereigns.
The notion of sovereignty, and its control over international law,
has been attacked both historically and analytically by modem inter-
national scholars. The concept of sovereignty established by the Treaty
of Westphalia was intended solely to explain a state's internal power
structure; it was not intended to govern relations among states. As the
term "sovereign" evolved it became synonomous with "the law," since
the sovereign had absolute authority over all relations within its realm.
However, when the positivist theorists attempted to assert the con-
tractual authority of the sovereign as the sole binding force in interna-
tional law, the doctrine lost its meaning: while it provides an excellent
justification for the binding force of treaties, positivism leaves com-
pletely unexplained the obligatory nature of the basic substance of
international relations - customary norms and practices.' 0 Moreover,
if international law is purely consensual then a state has not only the
right to give consent, but also the right to withhold or withdraw it at
will. Certainly a law which a subject can take up or put down to suit
his convenience is not a law in any true sense."
8. M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTENAIONAL
LAw 120 (1961). [hereinafter cited as KAPLAN & KA'zENBACII].
9. See generally I L. OPPENEI , INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (8th cd. 1955).
[hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM]; I D. ANZILOTTI, Couns DE: DnorT INTERNATIONAL
44-48 (1929); Kelsen, Recognition in International Law, Theoretical Observations, 35
Am. J. INT'L L. 210 (1941). This position was first propounded by George Freldrich
von Martens in ESSAY ON THE EXISTENCE OF A POSITIVE EUROPEAN LA% "oi" NATIONS
AND THE ADVANTAGE OF THIS SCIENCE (1787).
10. Kunz, The Meaning and Range of the Norm 'Pacta Sunt Servanda', 39 AM. J.
INTL L. 180, 181 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Kunz].
11. J. WILLIAMS, ASPECTS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (1939).
In actual practice, positivism can exist as only one of several ele-
ments in the formulation of recognition policy. As Professor J. Brierly
stated:
only a very gloomy pessimist would fail to recognize that common
moral and cultural standards do exist internationally, that they in-
influence conduct between nations and that this community of
sentiment, imperfect though it is, affords some basis for law.12
These customary international standards and obligations did not de-
velop in a natural law vacuum. The consent of states has been instru-
mental in the creation of international law; indeed, it is impossible to
impose any legal obligation on a state without its consent. 3 Therefore,
international law remains a balance between positivism and the con-
ception of a superimposed international legal order.14 Professor T. 0.
Chen alludes to this balance in The International Law of Recognition:
In the last analysis, the question of international recognition is but
a reflection of the fundamental cleavage between those who regard
the State as the ultimate source of international rights and duties
and those who regard it as being under a system of law which de-
termines its rights and duties under that-law.
5
B. Doctrinal Distinction Regarding the Nature and Function of
Recognition
The cleavage between the positivism and the concept of a super-
12. J. BRERLY, ThE LAw OF NATIONS 35 (2d. ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as
BRI.fLY]. In the fourth edition of Professor Brierlys book, he points out that "some
... nations... are inclined to look on international law as an alien system which the
western nations .. .are trying to impose upon them." In effect, "these nations have
begun to claim the right to select from among its rules only those which suit their
interests or which arise out of agreements to which they themselves have been
parties .... . Id. at 44. See generallj I.CJ. STAT. art. 38.
13. CHEN, supra r.ote 4, at 19-21.
14. Theorists from the sociological school of international law maintain that the
dichotomy between positivist and natural law concepts is balanced by "social solidarity."
George Scali maintained that ithe laws of societal development comprise the basis of
"objective law" (droit obiectif) in the juridical sense. He wrote "[t]he validity of positive
law is based upon conformity to the 'laws of causality' of the existence of society. This
primary legal basis we call objective law because it cannot contain any subjective ele-
ment. By 1948, Professor Scali had limited his position to a certain extent in the
Cours de Droit International Public. In this work, he did not mention that the laws of
causalty are laws in the juridical sense; he mentioned rather, that a material source of
law is the "legal potential" of society which corresponds to "social necessity," Norms
of law arise from this material source. International law, he asserts, can be explained
only in proceeding from the social factors of international life, which themselves are
the result of the "laws of causality." See generally Scali, Essal sur les aources
formelles du droit international, REcuErL D' ErTuEs sUR LES soUcRS DU Dnorr Eu e
HONNEUR DE FRANCOIS ENY, I1, 400-401; G ScATi, MANUEL DE Dnorr nrENATIONAL
PUBLIc 9 (Paris: Editions Pomat-Montehretien, (1948); G. TuHEIN, Timony oF IN t-
NATIONAL LAw, 230-231 (W. Butler trans. 1974).
15. Id at 3.
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imposed international legal order is manifested in divergent doctrines
on the function of recognition. None of these doctrinal distinctions has
been expressly adopted by any nation but all have had an impact on
the actual policies on recognition. Hence, an understanding of the
basic concepts underlying these doctrinal concepts is essential to the
formulation of any recognitional policy.
1. The Orthodox Constitutive Theory.
The constitutive theory acknowledges that nations, as sociological
units, enter ipso facto into the general community of states, with or
without recognition; but the act of recognition alone brings the nas-
cent entity within a judicial community of states.10 Constitutive theory
extends positivism to the field of recognition since it stresses the con-
sensual nature of international law. The past popularity of the constitu-
tive theory was the direct result of the vogue of the concept of State
sovereignty.'7 Hegel first outlined constitutive theory in Enzykldpadle
der Philophisehen Wissenschaften, when he asserted that states enter
into legal relations with one another in conformity with their own will
only by virtue of the act of recognition; before recognition no legally
cognizable relations can exist between them.18 Oppenheimer clarified
the relationship between constitutive theory and the older "law of
nations" concept in his Law of Nations:
As the basis of the Law of Nations is the common consent of the
civilized States, statehood alone does not imply membership of the
Family of Nations. Those States which are members are either orig-
inal members because the Law of Nations grew up gradually be-
tween them through custom and treaties, or they are members as
having been recognizediby the body of members already in exist-
ence when they were born. A State is, and becomes an International
Person through recognition only and exclusively.10
The constitutive theory gained widespread acceptance prior to
the twentieth century because no effective international organization
governed international relations; hence, rights and duties between two
entities could arise only as a result of mutual'iecognition of legal
personality.2
0
16. OPPENHEIM, supra note 9 at 144; A. PAViTmAN, SUBSTANCE OF PUBLIC INmTII-
NATiONAL LAwv 161 (1965) [hereinafter cited as PAVITHnAN].
17. CHEir, supra note 4, at 18.
18. G. W. HEGEL, ENZYKLOPADIE DER PHILOSOPHSCHEN WISSENSCIAF-riN §§ 331
and 547 (Rosenkranz trans. 1870).
19. OPPENHEIM, supra note 9, at 125.
20. PAvrrRAN, supra note 16, at 160.
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Examples of the application of a constitutive act of recognition are
rare in international practice since few states or groups of states have
such power that they can prompt the establishment of new states.
Neither have they, through recognition, non-recognition or enforce-
ment through intervention, the means of permitting or refusing new
States or regimes to be formed.2' Libya, established under the Italian
Peace Treaty of 194722 by the General Assembly of the United Nations,
is one recent example of the application of the theory.
Notwithstanding occasional resort to the constitutive theory, it
has many ethical and logical shortcomings. The cardinal defect of the
orthodox constitutive position is that the act creating statehood is one
of unfettered political will, divorced from binding considerations of
legal principle. It is this negation of legal obligation and assertion of
the state's right to full freedom of action in recognition which has
identified the constitutive view with the extreme assertion of sover-
eignty and so opened it to attack.2 3 This defect, combined with the
notion that recognition alone constitutes statehood, gives international
relations the appearance of a closed club with restricted membership.
Lauterpacht attempted to minimize the political aspects of recog-
nition by propounding a modified constitutive theory, under whicl
a duty to recognize arises when certain de facto criteria have been
satisfied. Such a solution could resolve the major problem of the ortlo-
dox constitutive position. However, the practical problem of the status
of an entity recognized by some States but not by others would remain.
This problem could be overcome by establishing an international or-
ganization to oversee recognitional decisions. But, with the recent
United States experiences in the United Nations, there may be sub-
stantial resistance among the major powers to yielding this traditional
act of sovereignty to the discretion of an international tribunal.
2
21. Scali, U.S. Position at the 29th United Nations General Assembly, TIn, UNIT=n
STATES STATE DEPART7,iENT REPORT (1974).
22. EVERY-NA'S UNITED NATIONS 161-62 (8th ed. 1968).
23. H. LAnERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 41 (1948) [hereinafter
cited as LAUTERPACnT].
24. On December 6, 1974, Ambassador John A. Scali, United States Representative
to the United Nations, gave an address to the United Nations General Assembly on the
role of the United Nations. He spoke of the "growing tendency" of the organiation to
adopt "one-sided, unrealistic resolutions that cannot be implemented" and of the As-
sembly's actions in seeking to "represent the views of the numerical majority of the day"
rather than acting as a "spokesman of a more global opinion." Representative Seali's
remarks illustrate the growing division between the United States and Third NVorld
countries as a result of the continuous adoption of one-sided resolutions. Press Release
USUN-191 (1974), December 6, 1974; U.N. Doc. A/P.U. 2307, (1974) at 47-56; A.
RAVINE, DIGEST OF UNrrFD STATES PPACTTCE N INTEnNATIONAL LAW 15-16 (1974).
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One of the most pressing moral problems with the constitutive
approach involves the reorganization of existing states. Under present
global conditions most new national entities will emerge from reorgan-
izations of existing states. The foundation of a state on territory be-
longing to nobody - on terra nullius - is such a rare phenomenon that
it can practically be ignored.25 Under these conditions, it would seem
unjust that a portion of humanity that once came under the protection
of international law would suddenly be deprived of that protection
merely because it has undergone reorganization.
20
These questions regarding the validity of the constitutive position
reflect the schism that has developed during the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries as a result of the transition from the sovereigns' "law
of nations" to an international legal system dedicated to protecting the
rights of both individuals and states.
2. The'Declaratory Theory.
The declaratory theory of recognition .developed primarily in op-
position to the constitutive position. As one scholar noted:
Nowhere is the brand of positivism current in the science of inter-
national law more offensive than in its application to recognition
of States. It elevates the arbitrary will of States to the authority of
the source not only of particular rights, however fundamental, of
States, but of their very rise and existence.2T
Under the declaratory theory, a state exists as a subject of inter-
national rights and duties as soon as it fulfills the conditions of state-
hood as defined in international law. Recognition merely declares the
existence of the de facto situation .
2
The declaratory theory emerged as a natural outgrowth of the
major revolutionary conflicts of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies. When domocratic nations replaced monarchical states, legal
scholars questioned why the mere accident of pior, dissimilar exist-
25. BnmrLY, supra note 12, at 138.
26. In addition to these fundamental problems that question the nature and scope
of the constitutive theory, there are also more theoretical questions that go directly to
the basis of such a doctrine. One of the most frequent questions asked of constitutive
scholars is: If the act of recognition is constitutive of statehood who recognizes the first
state? Another. oft mentioned criticism of this doctrine is that if recognition is only
binding among the parties, can it be forced to the absurd conclusion that states exist
only in a relative sense? See generally LAUTERPACHT, supra note 23, at 55-58.
27. LAuTERlPACHT, supra note 23, at 77.
28. Id. at 41.
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ence should give states the right to call into being the full internation-
al personality of rising communities.-2 " A leading declaratory scholar
wrote:
States being the persons governed by international law, communi-
ties are subject to lav... from the moment, and from the moment
only, at which they acquire the marks of a State.Y
Professor Chen, one of the foremost modem proponents of the
declaratory theory, sees the roots of this position in the concept of
natural law which attributes fundamental rights and duties to states
independent of their consent.31 At the turn of the nineteenth century,
the declaratory theory was substantiated solely by reliance on natural
law principles. However, present law of nations as manifested by in-
ternational conventions and tribunals offers a substantial body of inter-
national law with which to buttress this proposition.3 2 Indeed, since
signing of the Jay Treaty,33 a significant number of international con-
ventions have reflected the declaratory view. Moreover, many domestic
courts and most international tribunals have taken "cognizance" of the
rights inherent in an emerging entity.34
Notwithstanding widespread acceptance of the declaratory theory,
certain foundational questions are left unanswered, the most obvious
of which concerns the function of recognition in international law. If
the act of recognition is only a declaration of existing facts, then the
decision to grant or withhold recognition may be a tautological exer-
cise. Additionally, a right cannot flow from facts alone, except as pre-
scribed by some legal system that declares which facts shall be deter-
minative and finds certain facts to be true; conversely, all legal doctrine
relates to specific factual situations.3 5 In essence many declaratory
scholars have been so concerned with divorcing recognition from polit-
29. Id. at 45.
30. W. HAi.L, A TREATISE ON INTFRNATIONAL LAW 19-20 (A. Higgins ed. 1924).
31. CEmN, supra note 4, at 18-19; BIU.YL, supra note 12, at 609.
32. See generally U.N. CHAnTER; U.N.Y.B. 1001 (1970); Statute of the International
Court of Justice, U.N.Y.B. 1013 (1970); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, at 289; Charter of Economic Rights 'and Duties of State,
14 Ih-r LEG. MAT'Ls 251 (1975).
33. Jay Treaty, I TREATEs 586 (1901).
34. See Upright v. Mercury Business Machine, 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S. 2d
417 (1961); Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E.
24 (1923); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
35. KAPLA_ & KATZENBACM, supra note 8, at 110.
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ical consideration that they have minimized or disregarded the legal
function of and rights and duties flowing from, the act.-"
3. Conclusion.
The clear conclusion reached after examination of both recogni-
tional doctrines is that doctrinal distinctions will inevitably be aban-
doned in the field of recognition. The constitutive concept of the
unrecognized state as a sociological rather than political entity has
proven an inadequate and incomplete solution; this is especially true
when a government has been effectively established and a state of
permanence has been attained by the new entity."' Under similar
scrutiny, the declaratory position appears to have swung too far in
the opposite direction by overlooking the substantial role that recog-
nition plays in international relations.8
Assuming arguendo that recognition is a purely political act, the
effect that it may have on the emerging state cannot be discounted.
Recognition puts an end to an uncertain situation for the recognized
state, and assures its political position among nations.8"' In addition,
recognition is generally conclusive upon the internal organs of the
recognizing state, in particular upon courts of those nations which
adopt the doctrine of judicial self-limitation.40 These substantial in-
ternal and international implications have been minimized by the de-
36. Brierly replies that recognition is a purely political rather than a legal act. See
BliEnLY, supra note 12, at iCO. Kunz asserts that the primary function of recognition
is to establish normal diplomatic relations between states. See J. KUNz, DI, ANKIlLsnN-
NUNG DER STAATEN UND REGIERUNGEN IN VOLKEnECHT 95 (1928), in LAUtrEIPACIrT,
supra note 23, at 42 n. 3. In contrast to these extremely limited views regarding the
function of recognition, Nys and Pradier -Fod6r6 maintain that the act of recognition
manifests a state's acceptance into the international community. Before recognition, the
new entity possesses all of the rights which international law grants to a state, but it is
only after recognition by the other state, that the nascent state is assured of enjoying
these rights. See E. NYs, LE DnoIT INTERNATIONAL 70 (1912); I PRAnDIE-FoDERE , TIIAIT
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 237 (1885). In a similar vein, Erich reasons that recognition
serves an evidentiary function in international law, i.e., once a state recognizes a new
entity, the recognizing state is henceforth bound by its declaration. See LAUTEMUACIIT,
supra note 23, at 42. The most vehement reaction to the constitutive theory Is manifest
in Mexico's Estrada Doctrine. Under this doctrine, Mexico completely abandoned the
concept of recognition and proclaimed: "[T~he granting of recognition being an Insulting
practice implying a judgment upon the internal affairs of foreign States, the Mexican
Government.. . henceforth confines itself to the maintenance or the non-maintenance of
diplomatic relations with foreign governments without pronouncement of judgment upon
the legality of those governments." Jessup, The Estrada Doctrine, 25 Am. J. INT'L L.
719, 722 (1931).
37. See CHEN, supra note 4, at 77; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 23, at 52.
38. Id.
39. See VIsscERn, supra note 1, at 239.
40. See infra, note 77 and accompanying text to explain the doctrine of judicial
self-determination.
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claratory theorists. Moreover, there is a jurisprudential difficulty in-
herent in all declaratory theories. Legal personality is a creature of
law, not of nature. Under a legal system, the fact of state existence,
the key to declaratory recognition, may also turn out to be the very
question at issue. For these reasons the most realistic approach to
recognition is to abandon all doctrinal distinctions regarding its func-
tion and to adopt instead a more realistic evaluation of its practical
effects with regard to the international legal implications.
C. Roots of United States Recognitional Policy
From the early days of statehood until the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, the United States has steadfastly maintained a recogni-
tional policy controlled by de facto criteria. The rule was first declared
by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson: "It accords with our principles
to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is formed by the
will of the governed substantially declared." 41 Jefferson wrote:
The right to choose their own government, is a right whereon the
United States is founded, and must not be denied to other peoples.
Whether the choice be king, convention, association, committee,
president, or anything else should make no difference to foreign
States so long as it represents the will of the nation.42
By the nineteenth century the concept of not only a right but also
a duty to recognize was implicit in United States policy, as highlighted
by the controversy surrounding the establishment of Argentina in
1818-1823. In a letter dated April 20, 1818, Secretary of State John
Quincy Adams wrote to the Minister to Spain:
None of the Revolutionary Governments has yet been formally ac-
knowledged; but if that of Buenos Ayres should maintain the sta-
bility which it appears to have acquired since the Declaration of
Independence of 9 July, 1816, it cannot be long before they will
demand that acknowledgment of right - and however questionable
that right may be now considered, it will deserve very seriously
the consideration of the European Powers, as well as of the United
States, how long that acknowledgment can be rightfully refused.43
41. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Governor Morris, American Minister at Paris,
in I J. MooRE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 120 (1906) [hereinafter cited as
MoORE].
4-2. Id.
43. I W. MANNING, DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF TILE UNITED STATES CON-
CERNING T INDEPENDENCE OF THE LATIN-AmE ICAN NATIONS 61 (pts. I-I1) (1925)
[hereinafter cited as MANNING].
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In a communication addressed to President James Monroe on August
24, 1818, Secretary Adams expressed his views more definitively:
There is a stage in such contests when the parties struggling for
independence have.., a right to demand its acknowledgment by
neutral parties, and when the acknowledgment may be granted
without departure from the obligations of neutrality. It is the stage
when independence is established as a matter of fact so as to leave
the chances of the opposite party to recover their dominion utterly
desperate.44
When Spain protested the United States' announcement of its in-
tent to recognize the independence of the revolting provinces, Secre-
tary Adams responded that the United States was constrained to yield
to an obligation of duty of the highest order, by recognizing as
as independent States, Nations which, after deliberately asserting
their right to that character, have maintained and established it
against all the resistance which had been or which could have been
brought to oppose it.
45
Unlike the United States policy during the nineteenth century of
according full recognition to all firmly established de facto govern-
ments, Great Britain maintained a distinction between de facto and
de jure governments. This distinction arose as republican states and
governments first emerged, in an era when monarchies were regarded
as the only God-given form of government. Under these circumstances
the monarchical states bad to establish official relations with the gov-
ernment that actually controlled a specified territory, while still indi-
cating disdain and indignation toward the republican regimes. "Do
facto" recognition therefore developed to indicate that the regime so
recognized was the government in fact over a certain territory, although.
not a lawful "de jure" government. As the global political structure
shifted from primarily monarchical to primarily republican, the do
facto doctrine mirrored the shift and was utilized to "brand" revolu-
tionary regimes. Under the modem version, any government which
did not succeed by constitutional means was considered illegitimate, 41
The United States rejection of the British de facto/de jure distinc-
tion was reflected in the remarks of Secretary of State Martin Van
Buren in 1829, when he declared, "So far as we are. concerned, that
which is the government de facto is equally so de jure."41 A similar
44. MooRE, supra note 38, at 78.
45. MA mc, supra note 43 at 147.
46. KAPLAN & KATZENBACH, supra note 8, at 122.
47. MoonE, supra note 41, at 137.
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stance was reiterated by President Franklin Pierce on May 15, 1856,
in a message to Cpngress:
It is the established policy of the United States to recognize all
governments, without question of their source or organization, or
of the means by which the governing persons attain their power
provided there be a government de facto accepted by the people of
the country .... Their determination, whether it be by positive
action or by ascertained acquiescence, is to us a sufficient warrant
of the legitimacy of the new government.
48
The first hint of departure from the de facto policy was heard in
the post-Civil War Reconstruction era. In response to British and
French recognition of the Confederacy during the War, Secretary of
State Seward declared in 1868:
The policy of the United States is settled upon the principle that
revolutions in republican States ought not to be accepted until the
people have adopted them by organic law, vith the solemnities
which would seem sufficient to guarantee their stability and per-
manence.
49
Notwithstanding this radical departure from President Pierce's posi-
tion of twelve years earlier, the Seward Doctrine was never actually
utilized during the nineteenth century. 50
When the United States achieved a position of substantial military
and economic strength at the turn of the twentieth century, it con-
comitantly abandoned traditional notions of international law. In 1903
while Panama was part of Columbia, Secretary of State John Hay
signed a treaty with Columbia which provided that the United States
would pay Columbia $10 million dollars, plus $250,000 per year for
the use of the Canal Zone. The Columbian Legislature summarily re-
jected this treaty on the ground that the price was insufficient. Subse-
quently, on November 3, 1903, Panama revolted and proclaimed its
independence. Columbian troops dispatched to put down the revolt
found their way blocked by United States Marines sent to the scene
by President Theodore Roosevelt. Three days later, the United States
recognized the Republic of Panama, and less than two weeks after
that, the United States signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty authoriz-
ing construction of the Panama Canal by the United States. Later,
President Roosevelt boasted that he "took" Panama.51 The taking of
48. Id. at 142.
49. I C. HYDE, INTENATIONAL LAW 162 (1945).
50. CHEN, supra note 4, at 107.
51. See generally LATJTEHPAcHT, supra note 23, at 22.
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Panama is a clear example of a major power using its physical strength
ruthlessly to brush aside the legal rights of a smaller state. The United
States later rejected a Columbian claim for arbitration over this mat-
ter, and declared that "questions of foreign policy and of the recogni-
tion or non-recognition of foreign states are of a purely political nature,
and do not fall within the domain of judicial decision. 
2
Although Seward's remarks foreshadowed the entry of the doctrine
of legitimacy into the United States recognitional policy, such a posi-
tion was not actually put into practice until the Wilsonian Era. An
interim theory known as the "Tobar Doctrine" swept the Western
Hemisphere at the turn of the twentieth century. Dr. Tobar, former
foreign minister of Ecuador, advanced the proposition that govern-
ments that had risen to power through extra-constitutional means
should not be recognized. In an attempt to discourage civil war and
dictatorial rule, five Central American states agreed:
The Governments of the High Contracting Parties shall not recog-
nize any other Government which may come into power in any
of the five Republics as consequence of a coup d' etat, or of a rev-
olution against the recognized Government, so long as the freely
elected representatives of the people thereof have not constitu-
tionally reorganized the country.53
Although not a party to the initial treaty, the United States gave its
resounding support.54 The subsequently adopted Wilsonian recogni-
tional policy was remarkably similar to the Tobar Doctrine, but ex-
tended to all the nations of the western hemisphere. Explaining his
recognitional policy in 1913, President Wilson declared:
Cooperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the
orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon
arbitrary or irregular force .... Just government rests always on
the consent of the governed . . .disorder, personal intrigues and
defiance of constitutional rights weaken and disc.redit government
.... We can have no sympathy with those who seek to s6ize the
power of government to advance their own peronal interests or
ambition . ... [T]here can be no lasting or stable peace in such
52. Id. It is of interest to note that when, eleven years later, Secretary of State
Bryan advocated before the United States Congress the adoption of a bill providing
for granting compensation to Colombia, he referred to the action of the United States
in 1903 as an instance of the exercise of the right of international eminent domain in
the interest of the world. See C. CALLCOTr, THE CARIBEAN POLICY OF TZI UNITrD
STATES 383 (1942-).
53. Additional Convention to the General Treaty of Peace and Amity, Sept. 17, 1907,
art. 1, 2 A.J.I.L. 1908 Supp. p. 229.
54. I 0. HAcwoaT, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 186-7 (1940) [herenafter
cited as HACcvORnH].
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circumstances. As friends, therefore, we shall prefer those who act
in the interest of peace and honor, who protect private rights and
respect the restraint of constitutional provision.33
Under this policy, the United States steadfastly refused to recog-
nize the regimes of the Chomorro Government of Nicaragua in 1925,
the Tinoco Government of Costa Rica in 1917 and other revolutionary
regimes in Honduras, Guatemala and Bolivia.5 0 Throughout the twen-
tieth century the doctrine of legitimacy of origin has been alternately
applied and rejected by the United States. The elusive nature of 'legit-
imacy" affords ample room for arbitrary-judgment; hence the doctrine
has been repeatedly iisused as a pretext for political bargaining.5
The Huerta regime in Mexico illustrates this problem. After General
Adulfo de la Huerta came to power in February of 1913, the American
Ambassador reported to the United States Department of State that
Mexico was secure, and that the Huerta Government took office "in
accordance with the constitution and precedents."58 The next da9 the
Department determined that the government had been 'legally" es-
tablished but that recognition would not be extended until the new
government settled certain outstanding questions between the two
countries, particularly dealing with settlement of border claims and
losses of United States property.59 Although recognition was ostensibly
refused because of constitutional illegitimacy, the actual structure of
government was never seriously contested. Had the Huerta Govern-
ment legitimate or illegitimate, complied with United States demands
it would unquestionably have been recognized.00
The United States' failure to recognize the USSR provides a similar
illustration. In 1920, the United States asserted that one of the primary
reasons it refused to recognize the Soviet Government was that it
denied self-determination to the Russian people, in violation of the
principles of democracy.61 Two years later, Charles Evans Hughes,
Secretary of State, proclaimed:
We recognize the right of revolution and we do not attempt to
determine the internal concerns of other States .... But while a
foreign regime may have securely established itself through the
55. Id. at 181.
56. Id. at 190, 226, 234, 255, 385.
57. See generally CHmN, supra note 4, at 115.
58. HlAcxwom-, supra note 54, at 257.
59. Id. at 257-59.
60. See CmN, supra note 4, at 115.
61. 3 UmITm STATES FOHEIGN BrLATIONS 466-68 (1920).
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exercise of control and the submission of the people... there still
remain other questions to be considered.6
2
These "other questions to be considered" were not resolved until
1933, when the governments reached a settlement agreement regarding
confiscated property.03
As a result of the United States failure to recognize the USSR after
the First World War, the concept of recognition sharply declined in
importance. During this period many courts abandoned the precedents
of judicial self-limitation and limited the effects of nonrecognition to
sovereign relations. 4 Where private rights were Involved, the courts
abandoned the constraints of executive non-recognition and entertained
cases on the merits, thus liberating private rights from the political
considerations that manipulated the attitudes of governments. By
the 1930's recognition was generally acknowledged as a political rather
than a legal act. The Convention of Montevideo, signed December 26,
1933 by the United States, Chile, the Dominican Republic and Guate-
mala provided that:
The political existence of the State is independent of recognition
by other States ....
The recognition of a State merely signifies that the State which
recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights
and duties determined by international law.0A
The present United States recognition policy has fitiled to evidence
respect for international legal standards and obligations. The United
States Constitution vests sole charge over foreign relations in the
federal government. 1 This position has been consistently maintained
by judicial decisions. 8 The executive is the representative organ of
the nation in foreign affairs, and therefore the President and Depart-
ment of State control recognition policy, as most statesmen and writers
62. IAckwoRTH, supra note 54, at 177-78.
63. On Nov. 16, 1933, the United States recognized the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics as the de jure government of Russia. As an incident to that recognition the
United States accepted an assignment (known as the Litvinov Assignment) of certain
claims. See Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, DEPT. OF STATE, E. Evvop. T.S. No. i (1933) for the various documents
pertaining to recognition.
64. See HACKvORTH, supra, note 54 at 302-04 and Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil
Co. 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
65. See VisscHER, supra note 1, at 242.
66. Arts. 3 and 6, 28 AJ.I.L. 1936 Supp., p. 76.
67. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 8, 10; art. II, §§ 1-3.
68. See e.g., Zemel v. Rush, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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agree is proper. 9 There have, of course, been attempts by the Congress
to take a more active role in recognitional decisions, the most recent
of which is embodied in Senate Resolution 205, adopted by the 91st
Congress on September 25, 1969.
Resolved, that it is the sense of the Senate that when the United
States recognizes a foreign government and exchanges diplomatic
representatives with it this does not of itself imply that the United
States approves of the form, ideology, or policy of that foreign
government.0
Senator Alan Cranston,"' one of the authors of the resolution,
viewed the resolution thus:
There is a great deal of confusion about what U.S. recognition of
a foreign government really means today. The original recognition
policy established in the days of our republic when Jefferson served
as Secretary of State was quite simple. We merely ascertained
whether or not a government existed and whether it was capable
of sustaining itself .... The evidence is overwhelming that with-
holding recognition from governments of which we disapprove, and
with whom our relations are particularly hostile, has failed totally
to advance our values or to achieve any other significant and
enduring-purpose.7
2
The implication of this statement is that the Resolution was in-
tended to resolve certain doubts created by present United States rec-
ognition policy and to establish a rationale for recognition based on
factual rather than political considerations.
George Aldrich, acting legal advisor of the Department of State,
outlined the Department's current policy in testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1969:
Since recognition is basically a political act, infused with many
foreign policy considerations, it would be impossible to set forth
a workable formula that would determine whether recognition
would be granted in any particular case. The decision whether to
extend recognition is made after weighing a number of considera-
tions relevant to the basic question of whether recognition or non-
recognition would better serve the foreign policy of the United
States."3
69. See generally CaEN, supra note 4, at 226-32.
70. Senate Resolution 219, United States Recognition of Foreign Governments: Hear-
ings on S. Res. 205 Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. Res. 205]. The Resolution was adopted
on September 25, 1969.
71. United States Senator from California,
72. Hearings on S. Res. 205 at 233.
73. Id. at 9.
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He later added, "I do not think we have at any time in history
disassociated the decision to recognize or not to recognize from
broader considerations of what is in the national interest.""4
Aldrich's statements regarding United States practice combined with
his support of Senate Resolution 205 provide significant evidence of
the interweaving of United States recognitional and foreign policy
decisions. Aldrich perceived Senate Resolution 205 as a grant of
unfettered political discretion rather than as an appeal to return to
cognizable legal standards.
M. -THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING A NEW
RECOGNITIONAL POLICY
A. Different Levels of Acknowledgment Have Led to Inconsistent
Results in Domestic Courts
There are presently three levels at which the United States acknowl-
edges the existence of foreign states: cognition, cognizance, and rec-
ognition. The United States is obligated by international law to respect
the territorial integrity of foreign states."5 Cognition is an initial ac-
knowledgment that an entity has exerted sufficient control over a
territory such that interference with its territorial integrity would
constitute a violation of international law. Thus when the United
States takes cognition of the sovereignty of another entity it takes
note of the existence of the other state, without making any afflirma-
tive declarations. But, until the fact of actual control over territory
is noted, there is no cognition. 70
Cognizance is the act of some entity, other than the executive,
acknowledging a de facto situation and allowing consequences to
flow therefrom. In M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oi/, 7 7 Chief Justice
Ezra Pound, writing for a unanimous Court of Appeals of New York,
explained:
The courts may not recognize the Soviet Government as the de
jure government until the State Department gives the word. They
may, however, say that it is a government, maintaining internal
74. Id. at 10.
75. U.N.Y.B. 1013 (1970) at art. 2 § 4. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 107 (1965) (hereinafter cited at RBSTATE-
mnr].
76. N. LEcH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LECAL SYSTEM 768
(1973) [hereinafter cited as LEEcH].
77. 262 N.Y. 227, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
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peace and order, providing for national defense and the general
welfare, carrying on relations with our own government and others.
To refuse to recognize that Soviet Russia is a goyernment regulat-
ing the internal affairs of the country is to give to fictions an air
of reality which they do not deserve.-,
The Court in Salimoff was constrained by the factual situation to
abandon the doctrine of judicial self-limitation and to take cognizance
of the officially unrecognized Soviet Government and allow legal con-
sequences to flow therefrom. Full recognition, on the other hand, can
only be extended by the Executive when he takes note of the existing
facts and determines that all of the legal consequences of recognition
must operate.79
These three levels of acknowledgment have led to inconsistent
results in domestic courts and to controversy over what consequences
should flow from the act of cognition, or cognizance and recognition.
Under the traditional English concept of judicial self-limitation, sub-
ject to certain exceptions, no judicial existence can be attributed to an
unrecognized government and no legal consequences can flow from its
purported factual existence.80 United States courts reflected similar
self-limitation until the late nineteenth century. But in 1897 the Su-
preme Court in Undrhill v. Hernandez8' expressly recognized the
sovereign immunity of an unrecognized State and held that "acts of
legitimate warfare cannot be made the basis of individual liability."2
The Court reasoned that courts of one country should not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory; and that this principle cannot be confined to lawful or recog-
nized governments or to cases where redress can be had through pub-
lic channels. 83 The Underhill reasoning was extended in Wulfsohn v.
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 4 where the New York
Court of Appeals held that the unrecognized government of Soviet
Russia would be granted sovereign immunity, thereby barring suit by
a United States' plaintiff in an action for conversion of personal prop-
erty within the territorial jurisdiction of the USSR.
More recently, in Upright v. Mercury Business Machine Co.,85 a
78. 262 N.Y. at 234, 186 N.E. at 682.
79. LEmcH, supra note 76, at 768.
80. See LAuTERPAcnT, supra note 23, at 145.
81. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
82. Id. at 252-53.
83. Id. at 255.
84. 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923).
85. 13 App. Div. 2d 36, 213 N.Y.S. 2d 417 (1961).
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United States plaintiff, as the assignee of a trade acceptance,, sued an
East German corporation. The defendant asserted in its first affirmative
defense that as a creature of the unrecognized East German Govern-
ment, the corporate entity could not be legally cognizable in the United
States. The New York Supreme Court rejected this assertion:
A foreign government, although not recognized by the political
arm of the United States Government, may nevertheless have de
facto existence which is juridically cognizable. The acts of such a
de facto government may affect private rights and obligations aris-
ing either as a result of activity in, or with persons or corporations
within, the territory controlled by such de facto government. This
is the traditional law.86
Notwithstanding the bold stand that a few courts have assumed
in taking cognizance of unrecognized states, most domestic courts have
adhered to the traditional position and yielded to executive determina-
tion regarding acknowledgment of governments. Indeed, in 1923, the
same year that the New York Court of Appeals extended sovereign
immunity to the USSR in Wulfsohn, the same court held that the un-
recognized Soviet Government lacked standing to sue in a United
States court.8 7 This position was recently followed by the same court
in In Re Estate of Luks.s8 The question in Luks was whether certifi-
cates of conformity issued by consular official of the USSR in Latvia
and Estonia were valid in a New York Surrogate Court. The court held
that the powers of attorney filed in these matters were not valid because
the Government of the United States has never recognized the
forceful occupation of Estonia and Latvia by the Union of Soviet
Socialit Republics nor does it recognize the absorption and incor-
poration of Latvia and Estonia into the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics .... 819
Questions of recognition of governments lie exclusively within the
realm of the executive branch of our government and our courts,
can give no effect to an act of an unrecognized government which
either by implication or otherwise would indicate recognition of
that government.90
The problems inherent in a judicial system dependent on the
executive branch's determinations of the status of unrecognized states
86. Id. at 46, 213 N.Y.S. 2d at 426.
87. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E.
(1923).
88. 45 Misc. 2d 72, 256 N.Y.S. 2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
89. Id. at 74, 256 N.Y.S. 2d at 197.
90. Id. at 75, 256 N.Y.S. 2d at 198.
was illustrated recently in Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon.1'
The Federal German Republic brought suit against a United States
citizen in United States District Court to recover works of art allegedly
stolen from the German State Museum during the American occupa-
tion in 1945. The Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar (Weimar Art Col-
lection), an entity existing under the German Democratic Republic,
sought to intervene and also brought a separate suit against Elicofon.
The Department of Justice, on behalf of the Department of State,
filed a "Suggestion of Interest" of the United States with the district
court which indicated the following: 1) The United States Government
does not recognize the East German Regime, 2) The United States
Government recognizes the Federal Republic of Germany as the only
German Government entitled to speak for Germany as representative
of the German people in international affairs, and 3) The United States
recognizes the Federal Republic of Germany as entitled in this liti-
gation io represent the Weimar Museum as trustee of its interests.:The
District Court thereupon denied intervention, citing Banco National
de Cuba v. Sabbatino,92 and stating:
A decision by this Court permitting the German Democratic Re-
public to bring such a suit would be the equivalent of an assertion
by the Court that it acknowledges the right of that government to
represent the people of East Germany in international affairs. A
determination of that kind would be inconsistent with the presiden-
tial denial of recognition to the German Democratic Republic and
thus be an unconstitutional encroachment upon the power of the
Presiden.9
The Second Circuit affirmed without analyzing the lower court opinion.
While the case was on petition for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court invited the United States to express its views on the case. In
a memorandum dated January 1974, Robert Bork, Solicitor General,
withdrew his objection to the entertainment of Kunstsammungen's
claim, noting that "the relationship between the Federal Republic and
the German Democratic Republic has undergone significant changes."0 4
The Supreme Court denied the petitions for the w rit of certiorari and
91. 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), affirmed sub. nom., Kunstsammlungen Zu
Weimar v. Federal Republic of Germany, 478 F.2d 231 (2d. Cir. 1973). cert. dented,
415 U.S. 931 (1974), rehearing denied, 416 U.S. 952 (1974).
92. 376 US. 398 (1964).
93. 358 F. Supp. at 750.
94. A. Rovn , U.S. DEPT. oF STATE, DMcEsr OF UNrrED STATES PRACncE xN
INTONA-oAL LAw 12-13 (1974).
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rehearing, and vacated the judgment of the Court of AppealsY5 On re-
hearing, the District Court concluded that lifting the bar to prosecution
of the claim justified relief from the order denying intervention."
The Kunstsammlungen case is just one example of how the current
recognitional policy necessarily yields unsatisfactory results in the judi-
cial system due to its segregation of law from fact. This confusion can
best be resolved by limiting the distinctions between cognition, cog-
nizance and recognition, and by governing the policy by the de facto
situation at hand.
B. The Importance of the United States Evidencing its Willingness to
Uphold and Be Bound by International Law
Certainly the inconsistencies in the domestic judicial opinions
caused by the current policy provide an ample justification for a re-
vamping of recognitional practices. Another reason for supporting such
a modification is the importance of indicating a willingness to uphold
and be bound by international law. In granting or refusing recognition,
the state administers international law; it does not perform a legally
indifferent act of national policy. In this imperfectly developed inter-
national society, states are often called upon to fulfill a legal duty or
assert a legal interest without responsibility to a higher authority 7
Probably the main difference between the national and the interna-
tional community lies not in the lack of objective laiv for testing the
validity of acts, but rather in the lack of effective central authority to
apply and enforce the law.98 Sir John Fischer Williams once wrote:
Members of the Family of Nations, acting in the absence of a cen-
tral authority, when they admit to membership, have a duty to act
as in discharge of a duty to the Family and therefore upon some
general principle, not in a merely selfish and arbitrary interest 99
Contrary to Aldrich's assertion, there are clear and objective interna-
tional legal standards which should control the United States recogni-
tional decisions. It is only through self-interest that these standards
become clouded. Since the act of recognition can, and does, have pro-
95. Cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974); denying petition for rehearing. 416 U.S. 952
(1974). The United States and the German Democratic Republic agreed to begin
negotiations concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations, with exchange of notes.
These notes were signed in Washington, D.C. on September 4, 1974, and entered into
force on the same date. 25 U.S.T. 2597; T.I.A.S. 7937.
96. 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 806.
97. LAuTErPAcHT, supra note 23, at 33.
98. CHEN, supra note 4, at 428.
99. LAuTEmPAcrr, supra note 24, at 61.
found consequences throughout the wide spectrum of international
relations, world order mandates that the decision to recognize be based
on defined principles rather than unrestrained power and politics.
C. Normalization of Diplomatic Relations
Recognition is indispensible to normalization of diplomatic rela-
tions. If contacts between nations will be voluminous or important, it
may prove practical or necessary to establish an official channel of
communications through diplomatic missions. A government may rec-
ognize another state or government without establishing diplomatic re-
lations with it; on the other hand, diplomatic relations have never been
established without recognition. 100 Absent establishment of a diplo-
matic mission in a foreign land diplomats there are not protected by
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 01
In many instances these legal effects of recognition are not as im-
portant to an emerging nation as the practical effects of being formally
acknowledged by a major power. The mere act of recognition normally
provides a stimulus to trade and travel and.increases the prestige and
stability of the recognized government. Recognition often extends
the benefits of existing treaties, and provides access to state funds on
deposit in foreign states. The prestige it lends helps establish the state's
credit, thus making available private and national loans.
Throughout the past century the United States has repeatedly ac-
corded recognition on conditional grounds, such as the settlement of
property disputes. Whether this policy is called "conditional recogni-
tion" or "-political blackmail," the practice is objectionable because it
taints from the outset the atmosphere of international friendship which
recognition is supposed to foster.10 2 As long as international law claims
the name of law, it is impossible to concede that the primary aspect
of international relations takes place outside the law and that it is, in
its principal mode of manifestation, a matter of politics pure and simple.
100. RFSTATEmENT, supra note 75, at § 98.
101. See generally Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961, 500
U.N.T.S. 95. The International Law Commission has prepared the Draft Articles on
Special Missions. See the Report of the Commission in 62 AM. J. IT'L L. 244 (198).
The Commission has observed that the convention on diplomatic relations dealt only
with permanent diplomatic missions and that "diplomatic relations between states also
assumed other forms that might be placed under the heading of 'ad hoc diplomacy,
covering itinerent envoys, diplomatic conferences and special missions sent to a state
for limited purjposes." Id. at' 246. The draft provides personal inviolability of the
persons of the representatives which is substantially similar to that provided under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
102. See Cx, supra note 4, at 265-69.
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Thus, any doctrine which professes to regard recognition as an act of
courtesy or comity, the exercise of which may be jurally withheld, de-
prives international law of a permanent basis in nature, and fails to
bring recognition within the sphere of jurisprudence. Only through the
adoption of objective, de facto standards for recognition can the United
States assure all of the nations of the world that it is going to fulfill its
legal obligations and refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs
of foreign states.
IV. THE DUTY TQ BECOGNIZE
Recognizing a political community as a state declares that it fulfills
the conditions of statehood as required by international law. Before
recognition, such rights and obligations exist only insofar as they have
been expressly conceded or legitimately asserted or are compelled un-
der universal rules of humanity and justice. 10 Recognition, then, is
an international duty, rather than an act of national policy independent
of binding legal principle.
There is substantial precedent for imposing a duty to recognize in
both United States and international jurisprudence. Presidents Jeffer-
son, Adams and Monroe believed that when certain de facto criteria
had been substantially met, a duty to recognize the emerging nation
arose. 10 4 This position reflected the revolutionary origins of the United
States. International theorists and scholars from Bluntschilli to Lauter-
pacht have expounded at length upon the importance of imposing a
duty to recognize based on de facto criteria. Lauterpacht eloquently
expressed his position: 105
The basis of any scientific theory of recognition must be the realiza-
tion that there exists a law above States; that that law determines
the conditions of statehood; that a society cannot exist without
members; that those who compose it at any given time must, if there
be no other competent organs, apply the law which defines the
conditions of membership; and that full international personality
is not a concession of grace on the part of existing States. But the
law embodying these principles is not an automatic abstract rule;
nor is it pure jurisprudential speculation. It has no reality until it
has been applied by a competent organ acting in good faith and
in the fulfillment of a duty; and it has no meaning unless, when
thus applied, it is the indispensable condition for the rise of state-
103. LAurERPACHT, supra note 23, at 6.
104. HAccwonT, supra note 54, at 274-75, 284, 297, 299, 309, 311, 316, 318.
105. LAuTEmPAcHT, supra note 23.
hood as part of the international legal system. The legal character
of recognition extricates the process of recognition from the arbi-
trariness of policy; its constitutive character liberates it from an
equally disintegrating element of uncertainty pnd controversy.10
Notwithstanding the importance of recognition, many modem
scholars deny that there is a duty to recognize existing de facto gov-
ernments, basing this stance of the normative rule of international law.
This doctrine asserts that law confirms what under the pain of com-
pulsion, is the "right" conduct. Law is not merely a generalization based
on actual behavior, because its validity is unaffected by wrongful acts.
On the other hand, while law is unaffected by its violation, its con-
tinuous and unpunished breach, ultimately affects the standard of
"right." International law, being weak, is highly susceptible to the law-
creating influence of facts. Unless it is to be a flexible code for male-
factors, then, international law must steer a middle course between the
law-creating influence of facts and imperviousness to individual acts
of lawlessness.'0
Applying this reasoning to recognition,, these scholars argue that
the duty to recognize has been consistently disregarded and so has
fallen victim to the law-creating influence of facts.10 8 This position
would remove recognition entirely from the ambit of international law;
for any recognitional practice which does not impose a duty to recog-
nize, upon fulfillment of certain de facto criteria, cannot be considered
law at all. There is clear precedent under Presidents Jefferson and
Monroe for imposing a duty to recognize de facto governments. This,
combined with a desire to evidence willingness to be bound by inter-
national legal obligations should be sufficient to reassert the duty to
recognize and save it from the law-creating influence of facts.
In the recent cases of the People's Republic of China and the Ger-
man Democratic Republic, the United States has withheld recognition
because it would be inconsistent with existing treaties.109 When treaty
provisions make recognition impossible, a state is obligated to refrain
from all acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the
treaty.1 0 However, under the traditional concept of rebus sic stantibus,
a tacit condition attaches to all treaties that they shall cease to be oblig-
106. Id. at 76.
107. Id. at 47.
108. See generally RESTATEMtENT, supra note 75, at § 99.
109. See generally supra note 91 and Bank of China v. NVells Fargo Bank & Union
Trust Co., 104 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
110. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 3927
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention on Treaties].
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atory as soon as the state of facts and conditions upon which they were
founded changes substantially.' This concept was codified in Article
62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, of which the
United States is signatory.'-12 Therefore if treaty provisions preclude
recognition these provisions will remain binding only so long as "the
existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the
consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and the effect of
the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be
performed under the treaty.""
3
A more difficult question is whether in certain. situations, there is
a duty not to recognize a government. As Lauterpacht states:
From the jurisprudential point of view the acceptance of the policy
or of the obligation of non-recognition amounts to a vindication of
the legal character of international law as against the "law creat-
ing effects of facts." In a society in which the enforcement of the
law is precarious, there is a natural tendency to regard successful
breaches of the law as a source of legal right. Non-recognition ob-
viates that danger to a larger extent. It is the minimum of resistance
which an insufficiently organized but law-abiding community offers
to illegality; it is a continuous challenge to the legal wrong.'
14
Non-recognition is not in and of itself an effective sanction in the
nature of punishment that bends the will of the wrongdoer by the
overwhelming pressure of its immediate effects. It is, rather, as a sym-
bolic gesture respecting the authority of international law by lolding
a legal situation in suspense pending a definite settlement, which may
result either in the restoration of the status quo ante, or the adjustment
of the law to the changed situation of fact." 5
Although the act of non-recognition is not one of the most effective
sanctions, it can have substantial effects. In a recent paper, Raymond
G. O'Conner analyzed the use of non-recognition by the United States
as a sanction in bilateral relations. O'Conner initially concluded that
used as "a diplomatic weapon in waging the Cold War, non-recogni-
tion has not been an unqualified success."" 0 He determined, however,
that:
111. OPPENHEim, supra note 9, at 550.
112. See Vienna Convention on Treaties, supra note 110, at art. 62.
113. Id.
114. LAuTERPACHT, supra note 23, at 430-31.
115. See CHEN, supra note 4, at 441.
116. Paper entitled The Sanction of Non-recognition as Practiced by the United
States, presented to the Conference on Peace and Research in History, American His-
torical Society, Washington, D.C. (1969).
The association of economic and technical assistances with diplo-
matic relations adds another dimension to the efficacy of nonrec-
ognition as a sanction and may be more potent than trade and
financial arrangements. 1 7
O'Conner found this combination especially potent in Latin America:
The situation in the Western hemisphere has, in the past been some-
what unique, for the consequences of nonrecognition by the United
States usually have been more severe than when the doctrine was
applied to nations in Europe or Asia. The economy and general
well-being of the Latin American countries have been so dependent
on the "Colossus of the North that -the denial of the benefits of
recognition could prove disastrous to a new regime .... It is the
consequences which flow from the denial of recognition that make
it most effective as a sanction.1 s
While denial of recognition alone clearly would not force a wrongdoer
to disgorge illegally obtained property or cease violating human rights,
such a.sanction particularly when applied by a large number of nztions
does serve notice on all states that violations of international law will
not be disregarded. In addition, until the new government is recog-
nized, the territory in dispute remains legally open to reconquest by
the injured state. 119
Once a duty of non-recognition is accepted, two fundamental ques-
tions arise: 1) Can a duty of non-recognition co-exist effectively with
a de facto recognition policy?; and 2) Will non-recognition deprive
international law of its factual basis? The solution to the problem of
co-existence is not as difficult as it may initially appear. During recent
years, the formation of the United Nations and the International Court
of Justice has developed a vast body of international law that has sub-
sequently been codified and interpreted.120 Hence, international rights
and obligations are more clearly defined today than they were prior
to 1945. A policy could be developed whereby a presumptive duty
to recognize would arise once certain de facto criteria are met. This
117. Id. at 6.
118. Id. at 14.
119. This is the view of the United States. See instructions of State Department with
regard to the French occupation of the Ruhr, in which is outlined the rights and duties
of foreign occupants in time of peace. HAcvonam, supra note 2, at 146-48.
120. See generally U.N. CHATRm, U.N.Y.B. 1013 (1970); Chatter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States, 14 Im"z LE. MAxr'Ls 251 (1975); International, Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec., 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 (A/6316)
at 52; Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, ap-
proved by resolution 2625, Oct. 24, 1970, U.N. Gen. Ass. Bee. 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28
(A/8028) at 121.
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presumptive duty would be rebutted by clear proof of a violation of
accepted international law. Thus, the duty to recognize would be
triggered by specific de facto criteria, and the discretionary element of
recognition would be limited to determination of whether there are
sufficient facts to rebut the presumption. If so, a duty not to recognize
would arise. The adoption of such a policy may be merely a change
in form and not in substance. However, if legal standards are defined
and strictly applied, the political focus of the current policy can be
minimized.
The second problem, whether a duty not to recognize would deprive
international law of its factual basis, is more difficult to resolve. Non-
recognition, by its very nature, maintains a gap between law and fact,
justified as an effort to vindicate law and to restore injured rights that
would otherwise be lost. But this duty must necessarily expire when
the act of non-recognition becomes merely pro forma and loses actual
substance. Non-recognition must therefore be limited to a period in
which it will be of both practical and legal consequence.
V. LEGALLY COGNIZABLE CRITERIA FOR
RECOGNITION
When developing effective de facto criteria that will trigger the,
act of recognition, a distinction must be made between subjects of
international law and the governments that represent them. A state
cannot come into being without government; however, it may continue
to exist as a legal subject although temporarily without a government
competent to represent it. The converse is not true; if a state disappears
as a legal subject, the govemment representing it cannot survive.
121
When a new regime is recognized as the government of an existing
state, rights and duties of the state remain as they existed at the time
of the change; the state as a subject of law continues to exist though
its form of government may have changed radically. However, when
a new state is recognized, the question arises as to :its rights and duties
under international agreements, as distinguished from its rights and
duties under international law.122
Under present global conditions most new national entities will
emerge within the territory of existing states. This, however, does not
121. Blix, Contemporanj Aspects of Recognition, 2 AcAe~aNIE DE D11oiT INTE INA-
TIONAL: RECUEIL DES Coutas 597-98 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Mlix]; RESTATEMNENT,
supra note 75, at § 96.
122. RESTATaxMNT, supra note 75, at § 94.
obviate the need for developing a policy for granting recognition to
new international entities. New states may thus be established by di-
vision of existing states or by secession. There may be considerable
controversy in the case of division where territorial control is claimed
by both the old and new governments. Clear criteria based on legal
principles rather than unfettered political discretion, can, however,
provide a viable solution.
A. Criteria of Statehood
1. Defined Territory.
A state is a territorial political entity. Therefore, while certain non-
territorial entities may exert substantial authority and power, they are
not states. A modem illustration of such a situation is the Holy See.
For centuries the Holy See yielded formidable political power through-
out the world. Yet, until the establishment of Vatican City by Italy
under the Latem Treaty of 1929,123 there was no territory, and thus
no state.
124
There is no minimum size of territory required for recognition of
statehood, although recently the United Nations has been somewhat
reluctant to admit "mini-states" into membership. This reluctance is
due, however, to doubt of the emerging states' abilities to carry the
full burdens of United Nations membership, rather than doubt of their
legal capacity as states. 12 5 Moreover, the General Assembly has con-
sistently maintained that the representation of a state in the United
Nations has no bearing on the individual relations of members with
the states admitted or rejected pursuant to United Nations' collective
decision. 126
The fact that the borders of the new state have not been clearly
defined is no impediment to statehood. There must be some certainty
about the existence of some territorial base for the state, but clearly
delineated frontiers need not be established.127
2. Independent Government.
A government must exist that is actually independent of that of
123. J. WHE nER-BENN-rr, DocumEN~s oN INTErNATiO.AL AFAms 225 (1929).
124. See Cumbo, The Holy See and International Law, 2 INT'L L. D. 603 (1948).
125. Blix, supra note 121, at 632-33.
126. Visscrnm, supra note 1, at 238.
127. See statement concerning Israel by Mr. Jessup, Representative of the United
States to The Security Council of the United Nations, recorded in the U.N., S.C. OR.,
3rd year, No. 128, 383rd meeting, 2 Dec. 1948, at 9. Quoted in H. Biccs, Tim LAw
OF NA-oNs 71 (2d ed. 1953).
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any other state, including the "parent" state.128 The source of all rights
and duties of an entity in international law is its actual supremacy
within its territory over a specified portion of humanity, which enables
it to exert physical pressure on all those who may disregard its rights?2 11
States outside this territory must look to the organ which administers
the responsibilities of statehood. A government is essential for this
purpose. If such organization is absent it is meaningless for the outside
world to attribute rights and obligations to the population of a state.180
The independence must be actual and not merely formal. In the
event that an entity does not exercise plenary power over its popula-
tion or over international relations, it is far more practical for other
states to deal with the government that does in fact exercise authority.
The requirement of independence has in the past drawn political con-
siderations into recognitional determination. However, this require-
ment is essential to any notion of sovereignty. Therefore, a serious
attempt must be made to evaluate this element on de facto rather .than
political grounds.' 3 '
3. Stability.
The emerging entity must have a sufficient degree of internal sta-
bility to insure the habitual obedience of its population. 182 The ration-
ale behind this requirement is obvious: an unstable entity will not be
viable nor able to fulfill the obligations that it assumes.
Several elements should be considered in determining if there is
adequate stability to justify recognition. These elements include: 1)
the orderly transfer of power from the parent country to the emerging
state; 2) the absence of external threats; and 3) the internal stability
of the nascent state. The third element raises the question of what
evidence of internal stability will be required for recognition. Thb
United States standards have fluctuated. At various times policymakers
have looked to the popular support of the governed, 8 to the control
over a substantial part of the territory of the country without serious
popular opposition,13 4 and to the general acquiescence of the popula-
tion. 13 5 Clearly, popular support is not presently the standard for sta-
128. RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, at §§ 4, 100; LArEnPACIIT, supra note 23, at 20.
129. CI N, supra note 4, at 3.
130. Blix, supra note 121, at 633.
131. Id. at 633-34.
132. See generally LAurERPACHT, supra note 23, at 28.
133. See generally HACKWORTH, supra note 54, at 181-87.
134. See generally B. BOT, NON-RECOGNITION AND TnsATY RELATIONS 22-25 (1968).
135. UNITED STATES FORmcN RELAmTONS 100 (1913).
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bility. A government upheld by means of arms and terror may raise
a presumption of instability; however, such a presumption may be
rebutted by clear evidence to the contrary. Modem states can indeed
be born and sustained by force, and stability can exist even in these
situations. 36 Such stability alone, however, does not trigger the duty
to recognize. The question of stability must be distinguished from the
duty to recognize or not to recognize, with independent criteria for
each. A merger of the latter two criteria, that is, control over territory
without opposition and general acquiescence, has recently been artic-
ulated by the Department of State. As George Aldrich explained:
I think our present policy is more concerned with the acquiescence
rather than the declaration of the will of the people. I think that
what we have done in recent years shows a far greater concern with
deciding whether the particular government involved has effective
control and is not sitting on top of an imminent revolution, but does
in fact govern with the acquiescence of the people. We have not
generally concerned ourselves with asking, would the people, if
given a free plebiscite, endorse that change of government.ar
This standard, if applied in fact, would prove effective in determining
whether an emerging state^ has the requisite degree of stability to
assume the international obligations of statehood.
B. Criteria for Recognition of Governments
Recognition of a government, as distinguished from recognition of
a state, occurs only when an abnormal change of government is in-
volved. 31 It is a fundamental rule of international law that every
independent state is entitled to be represented by the government
which the majority of the population habitually obeys, and which exer-
cises effective control within its territory.1'3 Hence, the international
personality of a state is not altered by a non-revolutionary transforma-
tion in government. However, when there is a revolutionary transition,
the recognizing state must determine whether the new government
can maintain effective authority within its territory, with a reasonable
prospect of stability.
The standards for recognition of a government are virtually identi-
cal with those for recognition of a state: independence, effectiveness
of power, and reasonable prospects of stability and permanence. One
136. Blix, supra note 121, at 636.
137. Hearings on S. Res. 205, at 10.
138. See generally LAuTERPAcHT, supra note 23, at 87.
139. REsTATEMiENT, supra note 75, at §§ 100, 101.
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minor distinction in these criteria between recognition of states and
of governments is that under traditional concepts of international law
the established government is favored by a presumption of competence
so long as it offers the revolutionary movement "resistance which is not
ostensibly hopeless or purely nominal."140 Thus a revolutionary govern-
ment replacing an established government will have a more difficult
burden than will the government of a newly emerging state. This tra-
ditional presumption of competence appears at' first blush to be a
carryover from the "Law of Nations" in its effort to maintain the status
quo. The presumption is necessary, however, as a protection against
premature recognition. As Lauterpacht explained:
If States could proceed in this matter regardless of what is now a
well-established legal principle, the result might be that in case
of a civil war in a foreign country or, for that matter, even before
actual hostilities have taken place there on a large scale, there
would be nothing to prevent any State so minded from withdraw-
ing recognition from the established government and transferring
it to the rebellious party, with all the far reaching consequences o
the change thus affected in the legal position. The result, in inter-
national law, would be to reduce the established government to
the status of a rebellious group and to raise the newly recognized
authority to the position of the legitimate government to which
support and encouragement may lawfully be given.141
Indeed, the stability required in international relations would suffer
if the recognized government shifted according to the vicissitudes of
a civil war. However, this seemingly sound presumption must be ap-
plied circumspectly, to avoid maintaining a legal situation which is
wholly contrary to fact.1
42
Insofar as the exercise of international rights is concerned a recog-
nized state with an unrecognized government is in no better position
than a wholly unrecognized state. Recognition, of state or of govern-
ment, is fundamentally the ascertainment of the real source of power,
or, the locus of competent government within a body politic; and as
such must be based solely on legal and factual criteria.
VI. CONCLUSION
The charter of the United Nations encourages the progressive devel-
opment of international law.14 Under modern notions of international
140. LA ErPAcHT, supra note 23, at 94.
141. Id.
142. See generally CHEN, supra note 4, at 104.
143. See U.N.Y.B. 1013 (1970), art. 13.
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law there is a legal duty, as well as a moral obligation, to recognize
emerging states once certain legal criteria have been satisfied. This
note has traced the foundations of these legal obligations, emphasized
the importance of adherence to the doctrine and provided criteria to
be utilized in formulating a binding recognitional policy.
In the past, the Department of State, through George Aldrich, has
justified the politically based recognitional policy of the United States
on the ground that there is no legal duty to recognize. There is, how-
ever, substantial precedent for imposing such a duty. The Carter ad-
ministration has re-emphasized the importance of taking a leadership
position in the struggle for the protection of international human rights,
but it is inconsistent for the Executive to attempt to enforce rights
guaranteed by international law, while denying the binding nature of
such a fundamental aspect of that law as recognition.
In this year of transition, the President has a unique opportunity
either to support the foundation of a binding international legal order,
or to continue bantering legal terminology around as a camouflage for
purely political considerations.

